Stay informed Sign up for NCJRS to receive NCJRS` bi-weekly JUSTINFO newsletter and additional regular emails from NCJRS and NCJRS federal sponsors that highlight the latest research results published or sponsored by the Office of Justice Programs. Transfer of prisoners: anti-shuttling provisions: Article III(d) and Article IV(e) contain similar provisions that state that “if no charge, information or complaint is made before the prisoner`s return to the place of initial detention, such accusation, information or complaint may not have any other force or effect. and the Tribunal makes an order rejecting it by prejudice”, unless the United States is the receiving court and there has been notice and opportunity to be heard in accordance with Section 9 of the Agreement. If the prisoner requests a trial and is made available for criminal prosecution, the speedy Trial Act time limits apply, but do not begin to run “until the accused is actually present for the purposes of the plea”. See H.R.Rep. No. 93-1508, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 36. In the event of an objection between the time limit laid down in the Agreement and the Law on Rapid Judicial Procedure, the strictest application should be applied. United States, Mauro, 436 U.S.
340, 356-57 n. 24 (1978). See Odom, above, in 231 (“The Detainer Act and the Speedy Trial Act deal with the same purpose. To the extent possible, the interpretation of laws should not be contradictory. »). The courts disagree on whether the anti-shuttling provisions of the agreement are violated by a short-term withdrawal from detention of less than one day, which does not interrupt the prisoner`s rehabilitation program. United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 635-636 (7th cir. 1987); Sassoon v. Stynchcombe, 654 F.2d 371 (5th cir.
1981). Similarly, the return of a federal accused to a public institution where he or she must be kept under contract as a federal prisoner must also not violate the “anti-shuttling” provisions. See United States vs. Sorrell, 562 F.2d 227, 229 n. 3 (on the bench), cert. denied, 436 U.p. 949 (1978); United States v. Thompson, 562 F.2d 232, 234 (3rd cir. 1977) (in bench), cert.
Denied, 436 U.p. 949 (1978). Considering, however, the severe penalties imposed for breach of the anti-shuttling provisions, the utmost caution should be exercised before derogating in any way from the strict provisions of Article IV(e) and Section 9 of the Agreement. . . .